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Bye Bye Gorby
It was in November 1990 that Gorbachev took his 
wrong turn and ceased to be a major progressive 
historical force. This does not by any means deny the 
significance of what he has achieved so far; indeed, 
it would probably be too much to expect any 
individual to go further than he has. There is a limit 
to what individuals can achieve— even if they are 
Nobel Laureates.
The logic of Gorbachev's position re­
quired him to work with the existing 
forces in an attempt to achieve consen­
sus. The need to make compromises 
with the conservative forces always 
carried with it the risk of being cap­
tured by them. Gorbachev is to be con­
gratulated for pushing the old-style 
conservatives as far as he did. But ul­
timately there was always a limit to 
how far the conservative forces would 
go, especially  when they were 
renewed by younger forces. It was 
clear that, at some point, Gorbachev 
was going to have to make a choice.
Many people, possibly including Gor­
bachev, had underestimated the 
political sense of Boris Yeltsin, leader 
of the democrats. They thought 
Yeltsin a demagogue who could only 
succeed in opposition. When Yeltsin 
was elected chairperson of the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian 
Republic last May, many thought he 
would expose himself as the charlatan 
they had always felt him to be. They 
argued that he would never be able to 
develop positive policies and would 
soon be rejected by his disillusioned 
followers.
That has not happened. Yeltsin has 
grown in stature. And he is offering an 
alternative model of state power that 
more and more thinkers are finding 
attractive: a confederation of 
sovereign republics which only cede 
to the centre those powers which they 
voluntarily wish to cede.
Many top Gorbachev advisers have 
gone over to Yeltsin's camp—where 
they feel that their advice will be heard 
and acted upon. These include the 
leading agricultural economist and
president of the co-operative move­
ment, V Tikhonov, and the leading 
economist and economic reformer 
Shatalin. Many other leading 
democrats are in the process of going 
over to Yeltsin—this may include 
Alexander Yakovlev and possibly 
even Edvard Shevardnadze.
Gorbachev's sharp turn to the Right 
was probably greatly influenced by 
the recognition of the success of 
Yeltsin and the realisation that Yeltsin 
was becoming an increasingly viable 
threat to Gorbachev's power. It looked 
last October as if Gorbachev would be 
prepared to throw in his lot with the 
dem ocrats and take a mainly 
cerem onial or diplomatic role 
equivalent to the Queen of the Com­
monwealth. But, ultimately, the 
thought of being queen of a common­
wealth dominated by Yeltsin seems to 
have been too much for Gorbachev 
and he appears to have decided to 
defend the powers of the centre at all 
costs.
Personal factors were certainly not the 
only ones behind Gorbachev's 
decision. Other considerations in­
cluded the increasingly conservative 
orientation of the economy and the 
difficulties in launching real econo mic 
reforms, growing concern over in­
creased ethnic unrest, increased pres­
sure from the army leadership and 
other elite groups and general concern 
about the growth in crime and disor­
der.
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is the 
body through which Gorbachev legal­
ly exercises his power. This All-Union 
parliament is considerably more con­
servative than the separate republican
parliaments, especially that of the 
largest—Russian—republic headed 
by Yeltsin. The reasons for this dif­
ference are fairly dear. The depu ties of 
the Congress of Peoples Deputies, 
who ultim ately elect the Union 
Supreme Soviet, were elected earlier 
than their republican counterparts, at 
a time when the general atmosphere 
in the country was less radical. A third 
of their number were also made up of 
unelected representatives of various 
social organisations which were 
selected at a time when the Com­
munist Party was the only legal party. 
Finally, there has been a systematic 
boycotting of this assembly by the 
radical Baltic representatives; this is a 
move which strengthens the more 
conservative forces. For all these 
reasons, conservative forces in the All­
Union parliament are particularly 
strong. Recently these conservative 
forces have combined in the Soyuz or 
'Union' group which has been placing 
considerable pressure on Gorbachev 
through the threatening statements of 
its major spokesperson. Colonel Vic­
tor Alksniss.
The economic situation is also very 
disturbing. The latest official Soviet 
statistics indicate that in 1990 national 
income fell by 4%, labour productivity 
by 3% and exports by 12%. The grow­
ing budget deficit had been covered 
by printing money, creating a crisis 
which has finally been tackled by the 
draconian and highly unpopular act 
of withdrawing 50 and 100 rouble 
notes. While the reformers argue that 
this disastrous collapse of the 
economy is a consequence of the old 
administrative style of running the 
economy, the conservatives and 
centralists argue (with some justice) 
that part of the disruption is a result of 
the transition process itself.
The scale of ethnic unrest has horrified 
many; especially horrible have been 
the bloody disputes between Azer­
baijanians and Armenians, the Geor­
gians and Ossetians, and the 
M oldavians and Gaugaze. The 
centralists and conservatives explain 
this in terms of a general decline in law 
and order, while the democrats often
blame local conservative interests 
who wish to threaten the reforms, and 
insensitive policing.
The situation in the Baltic states is 
somewhat different, since here the 
ethnic strivings have so far taken on a 
more political, and less anarchistic 
*nd violent, form. Yeltsin has consis­
tently moved to defuse the ethnic con­
flict here. Immediately after his 
election he broke Gorbachev's block­
ade of Lithuania by negotiating a 
trade treaty between the Lithuanian 
Republic and the Russian Republic. 
More recently he has extended the 
trade treaty to cover political matters 
and has negotiated certain rights for 
Russian ethnics in Lithuania. How­
ever, he does recommend that they 
learn Lithuanian.
The position of the army, where there 
are many different groupings, is very 
complex. Many regular military 
leaders seem to be deeply disturbed 
by the use of troops for policing ac­
tivities. They had been highly critical 
of the use of troops in Tbilisi and Baku, 
even before the recent action in Vil­
nius and Riga, and they believe that 
the army should stay out of politics.
The large number of military deputies 
in the political system naturally have 
a different attitude. These are the in­
dividuals who make up the backbone 
of the Soyuz group and it was follow­
ing Gorbachev's stormy five-hour 
meeting with military deputies last 
November that Gorbachev took his
first major steps to the Right. Gor­
bachev reorganised the government 
and authorised the military to fire on 
civilians if threatened. The liberal 
Minister of the Interior, VBaka tin, was 
sacked and replaced with hardliners B 
Pugo and General Gromov. Several 
highly disciplined divisions of 
paratroops and KGB forces were 
transferred to Gromov's control in the 
Ministry of the Interior. And joint 
m ilitary / police patrols were 
authorised in the cities. It was these 
and sim ilar moves which led 
Shevardnadze to resign and warn of 
the threat to democracy.
However, G orbachev's collapse 
before the military hardliners is not 
complete, and, much to the disgust of 
the centralists, Gorbachev has failed 
to endorse their use of violence in the 
Baltic. Alksniss predictably described 
Gorbachev as indecisive and called for 
his removal.
The balance between the military con­
servatives—who wish to engage ac­
tively in politics—and the military 
democrats—who wish to stay out—is 
unclear. Gorbachev's position is driv­
ing him reluctantly toward the former, 
while Yeltsin is appealing desperately 
to the latter.
Finally, the law and order issue has 
now become the chief policy plank ot 
the centre. It has been the ultimate 
justification for the military involve­
ment in the Baltic, for the military 
patrols in Moscow and other cities,
and for increased KGB powers to in­
spect the accounts of private busi­
nesses. The political struggle in the 
Baltic and the entrepreneurial pursuit 
of profit are both interpreted by Gor­
bachev and his new allies as disobey­
ing Union legislation and as breaking 
the law. Yeltsin, however, sees it dif­
ferently: he accepts Lithuanian inde­
pendence and has already passed 
radical free enterprise legislation in 
the Russian Republican parliament.
While a case can be made that Gor­
bachev is still simply engaged in 
making necessary compromises with 
conservative forces, the reasoning for 
such a case looks more and more 
strained. The problem is that the for­
ces around Gorbachev are becoming 
increasingly conservative—and it ap­
pears Gorbachev is becoming increas­
ingly reliant upon them. More and 
more of his progressive advisers are 
coming to the conclusion that the fu­
ture of democracy in the country 
would be best served by a clear break 
with the conservative forces at the 
centre. Unfortunately Gorbachev ap­
pears to be resolved to defend the 
Union at all costs. It is for this reason 
that more and more people are con­
cluding that Gorbachev's progressive 
historic role is finally coming to an 
end.
STEPHEN WHEATCROFT it head of the 
Soviet Studies Centre at Melbourne 
University.
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Mikhail's Baltic Rubicon
Justus Poleckis is a member of the Lithuanian 
parliament and a founding member of the liberal 
Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania. He was 
elected in February 1990, one month before 
Lithuania declared its independence. As deputy 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he 
visited Berlin shortly after the Soviet Army's 
mid-January assault on the Lithuanian television 
station in Vilnius, which left 15 people dead. He was 
interviewed by Paul Hockenos in February.
Things seem to have quieted down 
in Lithuania. How would you 
describe the mood there, some 
three weeks after the bloodshed? 
In Vilnius the situation is still very 
tense. Although they live with this 
fearand insecurity, the mood isn't pes­
simistic. The recent events have 
radicalised the people. Whereas 
before there was a good deal of 
criticism of the [Lithuanian] govern­
ment and parliament, now both have 
unprecedented support across the 
political spectrum.
Before the army's intervention, there 
were two conflicting positions within 
parliament over the best course to 
achieve independence. One camp ad­
vocated a step-by-step approach to 
breaking away from the Soviet Union. 
Another group backed a much faster, 
radical track. The second approach is 
now much more popular. After the 
bloodshed, the people want to leave 
the Soviet Union with as little delay as 
possible.
That's understandable. But is that 
plausible within the context of the 
present political scenario in the 
Soviet Union?
Perhaps when Gorbachev was much 
stronger, he might have been in a posi­
tion to give the Baltics their freedom. 
Now, it's clear, he's completely in­
capable of this. Nevertheless, on prin­
ciple we object to the slower route to 
independence. The people's patience 
is at an end.
Some critics argue that the rejec­
tion of the step-by-step approach 
has only bolstered reactionaiy for­
ces, in effect setting back the inde­
pendence drive. Tactically, is full- 
speed-ahead the best policy?
It's debatable. But the Germans didn't 
wait years to dismantle the wall piece 
by piece. Lithuania isn't a power like 
Germany, nor do we have oi 1 fi elds like 
Kuwait, and therefore we receive no 
great support from the West. We, how­
ever, have a right to independence, 
and how flexibly we pursue that goal 
will be a critical issue.
Whatever our course, we were bound 
to run into resistance from conserva­
tive comers. Latvia and Estonia, for 
example, have followed a less radical 
independence policy, yet their situa­
tion is not less precarious than ours.
The treatment of the Polish and 
Russian minorities in Lithuania 
over the last year was used as one 
justification for the army's inter­
vention. How do you see this7 
Where do the minorities stand7
It's a fact that the Russians especially 
were unhappy with some of the new 
measures that parliament had passed. 
But since the violence erupted, it is 
clear that the overwhelming majority 
of both Poles and Russians have 
thrown their support behind the inde­
pendence movement. Last week I 
spoke with some Russian engineers 
and technicians at a Vilnius factory. 
They said that nobody, regardless of 
nationality, could in good conscience 
condone the army's bloody interven­
tion. They said that Russian lives 
would also be lost—although in Vil­
nius only Lithuanians were killed. 
However, they tend to back the more 
cautious path to full independence.
Is there any basis to charges of dis­
crimination and human rights 
violations against the minorities? 
Have Lithuanian nationalistic 
m easures fu elled  animosity 
among the minorities?
Mistakes were made, although these 
shouldn't be exaggerated either. 
Naturally, the new expression of 
Lithua nian national ism was felt by the 
Russians. For the Lithuanians, it was 
in part a reaction to 50 years of Russian 
domination over and oppression of 
the Lithuanian people. Many Rus­
sians were bitter about losing their 
privileged positions.
At the same time, the government also 
erred in its insensitivity toward the 
non-Lithuanian peoples. The legisla­
tion that made Lithuanian the 
republic's official language, for ex­
ample, was unrealistic and perhaps 
too nationalistic. All Poles and Rus­
sians were to learn Lithuanian within 
2-3 years. Less than half of the 
minorities can speak Lithuanian. For 
the older generations in particular, 
this as an im possible demand. 
Secondly, there were also too few 
radio and TV programs in other lan­
guages. The opponents of inde­
pendence concentrated effectively on 
this grievance. Lastly, there was far 
too little preparation work done to 
assist the minorities, including the 
Russian military personnel stationed 
here, with the transition.
In the week preceding the army's 
assault there were surprisingly big 
demonstrations, consisting mostly 
of Russians, against government- 
backed price rises. Were the 
protests manipulated?
The dem onstrations were spon­
taneous, but it was difficult to provoke 
the Poles or the Russians onto the 
streets. The economic measures were 
poorly prepared and Lithuanians, too, 
were angry. The protests were indeed 
manipulated by the conservative for­
ces that stood behind them.
Both in Latvia and Lithuania the 
conservative forces that oppose in­
dependence consolidated them­
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selves within organisations under 
the name 'The Committee to Save 
the Nation" [CSN]. It was the CSN 
in both republics thatcalled for the 
army's intervention. How much 
support do these groups have? 
Who comprises their member­
ship?
At the moment, it's unclear exactly 
who's in their ranks. In Latvia, it's been 
officially made known that the secretary 
of the Moscow-loyal Latvian Com­
munis! Party is in the Latvian group's 
leadership. In Lithuania, the organisa­
tion included 15 or 16 Russian and some 
Polish groups that were critical of the 
Lithuanian government and parlia­
ment. But since the intervention, almost 
att of those groups have distanced 
themselves from it, strongly condemn­
ing both the organisation and the inter­
vention. Only a handful of very 
conservative, Moscow-oriented ele­
ments remain within it.
When you say that the Vilnius 
events have "radicalised* the 
Lithuanian population, can one as­
sume that this also means a surge 
in nationalist sympathies? How 
would you describe the republic's 
nationalist parties? What is their 
relation to democracy?
It appears that radical nationalist 
groups, such as the League for 
Lithuanian Freedom, whose support 
had been very limited, now enjoy 
much greater backing. I would 
describe these organisations as Right- 
oriented, authoritarian and extremely 
nationalistic.
While almost all political forces are 
now united behind the fastest possible 
exit from the Soviet Union, there are 
some that would sacrifice the process 
of democratisation for immediate in­
dependence. Others, such as myself, 
favour pursuing both goals simul­
taneously, even under these very dif­
ficult conditions. The policies that 
affect minorities, for example, must be 
re-evaluated and the minorities better 
incorporated into the political 
process.
One gets the impression that the 
army was not entirely united on 
the action in Vilnius. Is there a 
conflict between the army person­
nel in the Baltics and the central 
high command?
I'm  not an expert on the Soviet 
military, but there is no doubt that 
deep divisions exist within the armed 
forces. One thing is clear, the soldiers 
stationed in Lithuania would not 
open fire on demonstrators. Special 
non-Lithuanian units were brought in 
for the job.
This, then, would lend credence to 
the charge that the command came 
from above, perhaps from Gor­
bachev himself...
Yes, my feeling is that general arran­
gements were okayed by Gorbachev. 
He gave the army the go-ahead for 
definite action, although without 
specific details. I'm afraid that some 
very inaccurate information found its 
way to Moscow, information that con­
ditions were ripe for a putsch. I think 
that this information was planted by 
reactionary forces intent on pushing 
through a harder line at any price.
Gorbachev's role in the military 
action, as well as other recent 
events have cast serious doubts 
over the Soviet leader's ability to 
carry out political and economic 
reform. Is the reform process at an 
end?
The chance for real democratic reform 
is now extremely slim. Two years ago 
I was very optimistic. Today I believe 
that only a m iracle can save 
democracy and perestroika.
The only chance is for Gorbachev to 
make a decisive shift toward 
democratic reform, that is, toward 
people like Boris Yeltsin. That, of 
course, is easier said than done under 
the present conditions. The conserva­
tives in Moscow can act even more 
ruthlessly than they have, and will 
certainly do so if Gorbachev takes that 
course.
Do you mean a military putsch?
The possibility is very real.
But is this "reform camp' a feasible 
alternative? Can they push through 
democratic changes without sparking 
civil war, economic chaos and ethnic 
conflict?
Hardly. I don't want to be overly pes­
simistic, but there would have to be 
very favourable conditions for them 
to pull it off. The leaders would have
to be very astute, the economic situa­
tion must stabilise, the republics 
would have to act much more 
reasonably and there would also have 
to be strong support from the West. All 
of these factors must be present.
What are the next steps for the Bal­
tics?
Negotiations with Moscow are the 
key now. We'll have to see if the 
central government is still functioning 
and if it is in a position to make con­
cessions. If not, we'll have to wait and 
see how things develop in Moscow. 
Western assistance— diplomatic 
recognition, admission into interna­
tional organisations, and so on—is 
also crucial. Of course, economic aid 
is also necessary although I'm not sure 
how realistic that is now.
There is still a lot of sympathy for 
Gorbachev in the West, especially in 
Germany Germany, above all, should 
not forget that it was the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact which authorised the Soviet an­
nexation of the Baltic states in 1939. 
That was the onset of our recent tragic 
history.
There will be a popular referen­
dum in March on a new union
treaty that would open the door to
full independence.
That is a Moscow-backed all-Soviet 
Union opinion poll which would only 
spell the terms for a new confedera­
tion between the republics. We are not 
voluntarily part of the Soviet Union 
and we will decide our status in our 
own way. Lithuania's own referen­
dum in February dealt with another 
question entirely—whether the 
majority agreed to a fully inde­
pendent and democratic Lithuanian 
state. Almost 90% of the voters backed 
it. That number wouldn't have been so 
high a few weeks ago.
What now?
Moscow won't be happy with this 
result, but it will be a factor abroad, 
proof of the consensus in Lithuania. It 
will also rally more support for the 
Baltics from the democratic forces in 
the bigger republics. Now those forces 
are our only hope.
PAUL HOCKENOS is a freelance 
journalist based in Budapest.
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Un A id e d
The 500 or so Australian women known to be HIV 
positive are the forgotten sufferers in the Aids 
tragedy. Unlike many gay men. the women have 
lacked the support of a cohesive, sympathetic and 
organised community. Frequently they have felt 
alienated, isolated and stigmatised by erroneous 
labels.
"Women with the virus are still 
thought to be IV drug users or pros­
titutes," said Sarah, a Melbourne 
spokesperson for Positive Women, a 
support group based in several cities. 
"In fact the women come from in­
credibly diverse backgrounds."
The very diversity of class, back­
ground and education is another 
obstacle for the women to overcome. 
Vet the disease has often proved a 
leveller when women finally come 
together. The suburban housewife 
who has never used drugs or cheated 
on her husband can find a friend in a 
heroin user.
"It doesn't seem to matter how they 
became infected; the fact they are in­
fected is what matters," said Amelia 
Tyler, HIV support officer at the NSW 
Aids Council.
A lot of women, terrified for their 
children's well-being, talk to no one 
but a telephone counsellor or doctor 
about their predicament. They cannot 
tell their children, immediate family 
or closest friends, and they won't at­
tend support meetings lest their secret 
is revealed. Motivated to protect their 
children from possible persecution at 
school, the women's understandable 
behaviour often serves to isolate them 
further.
The failure of many general prac­
titioners to diagnose the vims correct­
ly in women is a serious problem. Like 
many in the community, some doctors 
are blinded by preconceptions of 
"Aids victim s". Ms Average can 
present with rampant thrush, nausea, 
pains in her arms and legs, continual 
headaches and lethargy, and swollen 
glands but never be treated for the
virus as such symptoms would indi­
cate.
"She is treated as just a tired, stressed- 
out woman," said Amelia Tyler.
A lot of women are not correctly diag­
nosed until they present with oppor­
tunistic infections such as meningitis ' 
or pneumocystis carinii pneumonia 
when their immune system is so 
depleted it is hard for them to build 
themselves up again.
Diagnosed at an earlier stage, people 
with HIV can be offered a range of 
m edicines to help prevent 
pneumonia, herpes and thrush. Some 
evidence also suggests that the earlier 
the drug AZT is taken the better.
A survey by the WA Aids Council also 
highlighted the lack of sensitivity 
Aids organisations and other health 
care agencies have shown to women 
with HIV.
With gay men predominant among 
the infected, the sick and the dying, it 
was perhaps not surprising that coun­
sellors and doctors were frequently at 
sea when they encountered a woman 
with the virus.
The report said it was important that 
the Aids Councils, who had the most 
experience in Aids prevention, widen 
their jurisdiction to include women. 
They were a valuable resource but 
women with HIV saw them as gay 
organisations, not relevant to their 
needs.
Women with the virus often face 
dilemmas which gay men do not ex­
perience. For example, childbearing is 
a critical issue for some women with 
HIV, Asymptomatic women with the
possibility of a long life, sometimes 
desperately want to have a child for 
the same reasons any woman may 
want to have a child.
Yet doctors and family may be hor­
rified by a woman's 'selfishness' and 
persuade her the risk of the baby con­
tracting the virus is too high. Pregnant 
women may be coerced into having an 
abortion on the basis of misinforma­
tion.
Sarah said one woman had an abor­
tion after a doctor told her the baby 
had an 80% chance of being HIV posi­
tive.
Amelia Tyler said that there was a 
one-in-four chance of a child contract­
ing the virus from an asymptomatic 
mother. The baby*s immune status 
was unclear until the age of 18 months 
or so.
‘ Women are made to feel wicked and 
guilty if they go ahead with a preg­
nancy. It's a hell of a big decision 
women don't take lightly," said 
Amelia Tyler, "but if they have a heal­
thy baby their lives could be 
fabulous."
Sarah said women who decided not to 
have children often suffered pain and 
grief, and could not tell the truth to 
many people. As well, if they did not 
already have a partner, they faced a 
difficult sodal life.
"At what stage do you tell a potential 
partner? It's frightening for a woman 
to broach the subject because of the 
assumptions that may be made about 
her lifestyle," said Sarah.
Some women at last August*s 4th Na­
tional Aids Conference in Canberra 
felt strongly that women have been 
overlooked in the Aids prevention 
and health care campaigns.
It is clear that HIV positive women 
have been marginalised until recently, 
given scant recognition for the par­
ticular problems and prejudices they 
face. Sarah, for example, has lived 
with the virus for nearly seven yean
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but it is only in the past year that 
official attention has been paid to 
women in her situation.
Recently the federal government has 
allocated funds for several Women 
and Aids projects, including a grant to 
(he Positive Women group to formu­
late an information package and a 
video based on the experiences of 
women with the virus.
As well, the Social Biology Resource 
Centre, in Melbourne, is devising two 
videos for wide distribution which 
aim to make women more assertive in 
sexual situations. Based on a lot of 
Beldwork. which shows that even the 
most assured woman may be passive 
in bed, the videos will help women 
learn to negotiate sexual practices.
'A lot of women don't practice safe 
sex because they don't feel brave 
enough,' said Geraldine Thomson,
co-ordinator of the project. 'The most 
appropriate skills can be taught 
through assertiveness training."
Few would dispute that women need 
to be encouraged to carry condoms, 
and insist they be worn, or to avoid 
intercourse if condoms are not avail­
able.
However, some people question 
whether singling out women with 
special programs and campaigns is a 
good strategy in the fight against 
Aids. Too much special attention on 
women may have the effect of placing 
the responsibility and the guilt on 
them.
Susan Kippax, associate professor in 
behavioural sciences at Macquarie 
U niversity, advised the federal 
government against enthusiastic par­
ticipation in the World Health 
Organisation's Women and Aids Day
last November. "I said, 'hang on, let's 
direct any campaign to men and 
women'," she recalls.
It is easy for women to be cast again 
into the role of controller of men's 
mythic rampant urge to penetrate. 
The early condom campaign with its 
message, 'It's  not on, if it's not on", 
was directed at women. Yet to expect 
women to have power over men in a 
sexual situation, when they are usual­
ly less powerful in every other situa­
tion, may be putting women into an 
im possible bind. Certainly men 
should not be considered as hopeless 
and irresponsible and cast aside in any 
future advertising campaigns. Men, 
as much as women, need to be edu­
cated about heterosexual transmis­
sion and convinced to take equal 
responsibility for practising safe sex.
ADELE HORIN is a journalist with the
Sydney Morning Herald,
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